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In September 1998 the Federal Reserve orga-
nized a rescue of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment, a very large and prominent hedge fund on
the brink of failure. The Fed intervened because
it was concerned about possible dire conse-
quences for world financial markets if it allowed
the hedge fund to fail. 
The Fed’s intervention was misguided and
unnecessary because LTCM would not have
failed anyway, and the Fed’s concerns about the
effects of LTCM’s failure on financial markets
were exaggerated. In the short run the interven-
tion helped the shareholders and managers of
LTCM to get a better deal for themselves
than they would otherwise have obtained.
The intervention also is having more serious
long-term consequences: it encourages more
calls for the regulation of hedge-fund activity,
which may drive such activity further offshore;
it implies a major open-ended extension of
Federal Reserve responsibilities, without any
congressional authorization; it implies a return
to the discredited doctrine that the Fed should
prevent the failure of large financial firms,
which encourages irresponsible risk taking; and
it undermines the moral authority of Fed poli-
cymakers in their efforts to encourage their
counterparts in other countries to persevere
with the difficult process of economic liberaliza-
tion. 
September 23, 1999
Introduction
In September 1998 the Federal Reserve
organized a rescue of Long-Term Capital
Management, a very prominent U.S. hedge
fund on the brink of failure. The Fed inter-
vened because it was concerned about the
possibility of dire consequences for world
financial markets if it allowed the firm to fail. 
The Fed’s rescue of LTCM was misguided.
The intervention was not necessary to pre-
vent the failure of LTCM. The firm would not
have failed, and even if it had, there would
not have been the dire consequences that
Federal Reserve officials feared. Indeed, let-
ting LTCM fail might well have had a salu-
tary effect on financial markets: it would
have sent a strong and convincing signal that
no financial firm—however big—could expect
to be bailed out from the consequences of its
own mismanagement. 
The rescue of LTCM also has a number of
detrimental consequences. It encourages
more calls for the regulation of hedge-fund
activities, which would be pointless at best
and counterproductive at worst. The rescue
also implies a massive and open-ended exten-
sion of Federal Reserve responsibilities, with-
out any congressional mandate. In addition,
the rescue implies a return by the Federal
Reserve to the discredited doctrine of “too
big to fail”—the belief that the Fed will rescue
big financial firms in difficulty—for fear of
the possible effects on financial markets of
letting big firms fail. Too big to fail encour-
ages irresponsible risk taking by financial
firms, which makes them weaker and finan-
cial markets more fragile. Finally, the rescue
of LTCM does a lot of damage to the credi-
bility and moral authority of Federal Reserve
policymakers in their efforts to encourage
their counterparts in other countries to per-
severe with the necessary but difficult process
of economic liberalization. 
What Are Hedge Funds?
Hedge funds are private investment funds
that aim to make profits for their sharehold-
ers by trading securities. Hedge funds vary
enormously but fall into two main classes.
The first is macro funds, which take specula-
tive (i.e., unhedged) positions in financial
markets on the basis of their analyses of
financial and macroeconomic conditions.
They bet on exchange-rate devaluations,
changes in macroeconomic policies, interest-
rate movements, and so on. Macro funds are
thus “hedge” funds in name only. They make
their profits from speculation, and their
portfolios are often highly risky. Most macro
hedge funds are also highly leveraged—that
is, the amounts invested in their portfolios,
the firms’ assets, are much greater than their
share capital, with investments in excess of
capital being financed by borrowing.
Leverage increases the potential profits of
shareholders, but it also increases their risks:
the greater the leverage, the bigger the profit
to shareholders if investments are successful
and the bigger the loss to shareholders if they
are not. A highly leveraged fund can therefore
make very high profits but also runs a rela-
tively high risk of going bankrupt. Macro
funds are highly leveraged relative to most
other institutional investors and typically
have asset bases five to nine times greater
than their capital.1
The other main class of hedge funds is rel-
ative-value, or arbitrage, funds. Those funds
use sophisticated models to detect arbitrage
opportunities—differences in the prices of
nearly equivalent securities or portfolios—in
financial markets. Having detected such
opportunities, those funds construct arbi-
trage trading strategies to profit: they buy
securities that are underpriced and sell those
that are overpriced, while simultaneously
taking offsetting positions to hedge against
any risks involved and lock in their arbitrage
profits. Financial-market arbitrage is a rela-
tively low-risk activity, so relative-value funds
often operate with much higher leverage
than do macro funds.2
In the United States, hedge funds with
fewer than 100 shareholders are exempt from
regulation under the Securities Act of 1933,
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Most U.S.
hedge funds therefore restrict the number of
their shareholders to fewer than 100.
Overseas hedge funds are also usually subject
to little or no regulation, particularly those
operating from offshore centers, such as the
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. The
hedge-fund industry is thus largely unregu-
lated.
Despite its growth in recent years, the
industry still is only a very small part of the
overall institutional investment sector. A
recent International Monetary Fund report
estimated that the total amount of capital
invested in hedge funds in the third quarter
of 1997 was about $100 billion. By compari-
son, other institutional investors—pension
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies,
banks, and so on—had a combined capital of
well over $20 trillion.3 Hedge funds therefore
account for less than 0.5 percent of the total
capital of the institutional investment sector. 
Nonetheless, hedge funds have received
considerable attention during the last
decade, most particularly because of their
role in a number of recent exchange-rate
crises. Perhaps the best-known example is
George Soros’s Quantum Fund, a macro
fund reputed to have made more than $1 bil-
lion at the British government’s expense by
betting against the pound in the European
exchange-rate crisis of September 1992.
Hedge funds have also figured prominently
in more recent crises, including those in
Latin America, the Far East, and Russia in the
last couple of years. The activities of hedge
funds have led to major controversy over
their impact on the world financial system
and to calls from some quarters that hedge
funds be regulated.4
The Story of LTCM
Long-Term Capital Management was
founded in March 1994 by John Meriwether,
a former Salomon Brothers trading star,
along with a small group of associates, most
notably economists Robert Merton and
Myron Scholes, who received the Nobel Prize
in economics in 1997. The fund initially spe-
cialized in high-volume arbitrage trades in
bond and bond-derivatives markets but grad-
ually became more active in other markets
and more willing to speculate. The fund thus
started as an arbitrage fund but gradually
became more like a macro fund. LTCM was
very successful: by the end of 1997 it had
achieved annual rates of return of around 40
percent and had nearly tripled its investors’
money. That track record and the prestige of
its associates made LTCM very popular with
investors, and the companies and individuals
investing in LTCM “read like a who’s who list
of high finance.”5 LTCM was the darling of
Wall Street. 
By that stage, it appears that the fund’s
assets had grown to about $120 billion and
its capital to about $7.3 billion.6 However,
despite that high leverage—an assets-to-equi-
ty ratio of over 16 to 1—the management of
LTCM concluded that the capital base was
too high to earn the rate of return on capital
for which they were aiming. They therefore
returned $2.7 billion of capital to sharehold-
ers, thus cutting the fund’s capital to $4.8 bil-
lion and increasing its leverage ratio to
around 25 to 1. In effect, the management of
LTCM had taken a major gamble: they made
the firm much riskier, in the hope of bolster-
ing the returns to shareholders. 
LTCM Gets into Difficulties
Unfortunately, LTCM’s luck ran out not
long afterwards. Most markets were edgy
during the first part of 1998, but market con-
ditions deteriorated sharply in the summer
and led to major losses for LTCM in July.
Disaster then struck the next month, when
the Russian government devalued the ruble
and declared a moratorium on future debt
repayments. Those events led to a major dete-
rioration in the creditworthiness of many
emerging-market bonds and corresponding
large increases in the spreads between the
prices of Western government and emerging-
market bonds. Those developments were very
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bad for LTCM because the fund had bet mas-
sively on those spreads’ narrowing. To make
matters worse, the fund sustained major loss-
es on other speculative positions as well. As a
result, by the end of August LTCM’s capital
was down to $2.3 billion and the fund had
lost over half of the equity capital it had had
at the start of the year. By that time, its asset
base was about $107 billion, so its leverage
ratio had climbed to over 45 to 1—a very high
ratio by any standards, but especially in that
volatile environment.7
As its losses mounted, the fund had
increasing difficulty meeting margin calls
and needed more collateral to ensure that it
could meet its obligations to counterparties.
The fund was running short of high-quality
assets for collateral to maintain its positions,
and it also had great difficulty liquidating its
positions: many of its positions were relative-
ly illiquid (i.e., difficult to sell) even in normal
times and hence still more difficult to
sell—especially in a hurry—in nervous and
declining markets. 
The fund was now in very serious difficul-
ties and, on September 2, 1998, the partners
sent a letter to investors acknowledging the
fund’s problems and seeking an injection of
new capital to sustain it. Not surprisingly,
that information soon leaked out and the
fund’s problems became common knowl-
edge.
LTCM’s situation continued to deterio-
rate in September, and the fund’s manage-
ment spent the next three weeks looking for
assistance in an increasingly desperate effort
to keep the fund afloat. However, no immedi-
ate help was forthcoming, and by September
19 the fund’s capital was down to only $600
million.8 The fund had an asset base of $80
billion at that point,9 and its leverage ratio
was approaching stratospheric levels—a sure
sign of impending doom. No one who knew
LTCM’s situation really expected the fund to
make it through the next week without out-
side assistance. 
The Federal Reserve Intervenes
Wall Street and the Federal Reserve had
observed LTCM’s deterioration with mount-
ing concern. Many Wall Street firms had
large stakes in LTCM, and there was also
widespread concern about the potential
impact on financial markets if LTCM were to
fail. The Fed felt obliged to intervene, and a
delegation from the New York Federal
Reserve and the U.S. Treasury visited the
fund on Sunday, September 20, to assess the
situation.10 At that meeting fund partners
persuaded the delegation that LTCM’s situa-
tion was not only bad but potentially much
worse than market participants imagined.
The Fed concluded that some form of sup-
port operation should be prepared—and pre-
pared very rapidly—to prevent LTCM’s fail-
ure and to forestall what the Fed feared
might otherwise be disastrous effects on
financial markets.
Accordingly, the New York Federal
Reserve invited a number of the creditor
firms most involved to discuss a rescue pack-
age, and it was soon agreed that this Federal
Reserve–led consortium would mount a res-
cue if no one else took over the fund in the
meantime. However, when representatives of
that group met on the early morning of
Wednesday, September 23, they learned that
another group had just made an offer for the
fund and that that offer would expire at
lunchtime that day. It was therefore decided
to wait and see how LTCM responded to that
offer before proceeding any further. 
A group consisting of Warren Buffett’s
firm, Berkshire Hathaway, along with
Goldman Sachs and American International
Group, a giant insurance holding company,
offered to buy out the shareholders for $250
million and put $3.75 billion into the fund as
new capital. That offer would have put the
fund on a much firmer financial basis and
staved off failure. However, the existing
shareholders would have lost everything
except for the $250 million takeover pay-
ment, and the fund’s managers would have
been fired. The motivation behind this offer
was strictly commercial; it had nothing to do
with saving world financial markets. As one
news report later put it:
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Buffett wasn’t offering public chari-
ty. He was trying to do what he
preaches: buy something for much
less than he thinks it’s worth. Ditto
for Goldman Sachs, which made
tons of money dealing in bankrupt-
cies, salvaging financially distressed
real estate. . . . These folks weren’t out
to save the world’s financial markets;
they were out to make a buck out of
Long-Term Capital’s barely breath-
ing body.11
Had it been accepted, that offer would
have ended the crisis without any further
involvement of the Federal Reserve—a text-
book example of how private-sector parties
can resolve financial crises on their own,
without Federal Reserve or other regulatory
involvement.
But that was not to be. The management
of LTCM rejected the offer, and one can only
presume that they did so because they were
confident of getting a better deal from the
Federal Reserve’s consortium.12 The Fed
therefore reconvened discussions to hammer
out a rescue package, which was agreed on by
the end of the day. The package was prompt-
ly accepted by LTCM and immediately made
public. Under the terms of the deal, 14 promi-
nent banks and brokerage houses—including
UBS, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch but
not the Federal Reserve—agreed to invest
$3.65 billion of equity capital in LTCM in
exchange for 90 percent of the firm’s equity.
Existing shareholders would therefore retain
a 10 percent holding, valued at about $400
million. This offer was clearly better for the
existing shareholders than was Buffett’s offer.
It was also better for the managers of LTCM,
who would retain their jobs for the time
being and earn management fees they would
have lost had Buffett taken over. Control of
the fund passed to a new steering committee
made up of representatives from the consor-
tium, and the announcement of the rescue
ended concerns about LTCM’s immediate
future. By the end of the year, the fund was
making profits again. 
Was the Federal Reserve
Justified?
The immediate reaction of most observers
in the financial world was relief that the fail-
ure of LTCM had been avoided, and the res-
cue package was generally well received on
Wall Street, although some financial
observers expressed concerns about its
longer-term implications. Elsewhere, reac-
tions were generally less favorable, and there
was considerable criticism of the manage-
ment of LTCM for getting into difficulties
and of the Federal Reserve for bailing out the
fund. Responding to those concerns, the
House Committee on Banking and Financial
Services called a hearing on the issue and
invited some of the participants to give evi-
dence. Among those called were the president
of the New York Federal Reserve, William
McDonough, and the chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan. Both
officials testified before the House commit-
tee on October 1. Their testimony focused on
three main issues:
• The rescue package itself,
• The necessity (or otherwise) of Federal
Reserve intervention, and
• The consequences for financial mar-
kets if LTCM had failed.
The Rescue: Private-Sector
Solution or Federal Reserve
Bailout?
In his testimony, McDonough defended
the rescue package as “a private sector solu-
tion to a private-sector problem, involving an
investment of new equity by Long-Term
Capital’s creditors and counterparties.” He
bristled at the claim that the Federal Reserve
had “bailed out” LTCM, pointing out that
control had passed to the 14-member credi-
tor group and that “the original equity-hold-
ers [had] taken a severe hit.” He also stressed
that “no Federal Reserve official pressured
anyone, and no promises were made. Not one
penny of public money was spent or commit-
ted.”13 Greenspan echoed that argument and
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claimed that the LTCM episode was one of
those “rare occasions” when financial mar-
kets seize up and “temporary ad hoc respons-
es” are required. He also compared the LTCM
rescue to the famous occasion when J. P.
Morgan convened the leading bankers of his
day in his library to discuss how they were
going to resolve the financial crisis of 1907.14
There is a certain irony in central bankers’
defending their resolution of the LTCM
problem on the grounds that it was much the
same as a purely private-sector solution to
the same problem. If the central bank merely
mimicked the private sector, then why did it
need to get involved at all? Why couldn’t it
have sat back and let Warren Buffett and his
associates in the private sector do the job?
Indeed, what would be the point of having
the Federal Reserve regulate financial institu-
tions at all? The arguments put forward by
McDonough and Greenspan thus under-
mine the very actions they were trying to
defend.
McDonough’s testimony also invites the
response that an intervention led by a federal
body can hardly be described as a “private sec-
tor solution to a private-sector problem.” The
Federal Reserve did intervene, and pointing
out that it did not pressure institutions to
participate or spend or commit public money
does not alter that fact.
For his part, Greenspan overlooks the
point that the 1907 crisis was resolved by pri-
vate-sector parties operating on their
own—as they had to, because there was no
central bank at the time—while the LTCM
crisis was resolved by a rescue package put
together by the central bank. The lesson to
draw from a comparison of the two crises is
therefore not that the LTCM rescue was justi-
fied because it was like the resolution of 1907.
Instead, the appropriate lesson is almost the
opposite: that if private-sector parties operat-
ing on their own could resolve the crisis of
1907, then there was no need for the Fed to
intervene in 1998. If 1907 tells us anything
about the LTCM episode, it suggests that the
private sector could have resolved the crisis
on its own—a conclusion that is also borne
out by the plain facts of the case itself. 
Did the Federal Reserve Need to
Intervene to Stop the Failure of
LTCM?
Both officials also argued strongly that
the Federal Reserve was obliged to prevent
the failure of LTCM by fear of the adverse
effects that LTCM’s failure might have had
on financial markets. As Greenspan put it:
Financial market participants were
already unsettled by recent global
events. Had the failure of LTCM trig-
gered the seizing up of markets, sub-
stantial damage could have been
inflicted on many market partici-
pants, including some not directly
involved with the firm, and could
have potentially impaired the
economies of many nations, includ-
ing our own. . . . Moreover, our sense
was that the consequences of a fire
sale triggered by cross-default claus-
es, should LTCM fail on some of its
obligations, risked a severe drying up
of market liquidity. . . . In that envi-
ronment, it was the FRBNY’s
[Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s]
judgment that it was to the advan-
tage of all parties—including the
creditors and other market partici-
pants—to engender if at all possible
an orderly resolution rather than let
the firm go into disorderly fire-sale
liquidation.15
The Federal Reserve, therefore,
moved more quickly to provide their
good offices to help resolve the
affairs of LTCM than would have
been the case in more normal times.
In effect, the threshold of action was
lowered by the knowledge that mar-
kets had recently become fragile.16
There is no denying that Federal Reserve
officials were genuinely concerned about the
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impact that LTCM’s failure might have on
financial markets. Nonetheless, Greenspan’s
argument begs the central question: it pre-
supposes that LTCM would have failed if the
Fed had not intervened, and yet it is mani-
festly the case that LTCM would not have
failed in the absence of the Fed’s interven-
tion. 
If the Federal Reserve had washed its
hands of LTCM early on the morning of
September 23, 1998—and made clear to
LTCM that it was doing so—the management
of LTCM would have faced a set of alterna-
tives very different from the one they actually
faced at the time. Instead of choosing
between the Buffett offer and the likelihood
of a better offer later in the day, they would
have had to choose between the Buffett offer
and almost certain failure. The Buffett offer
was not a generous one: it would have cost
the management of LTCM their remaining
equity, their jobs, and any future manage-
ment fees they might have obtained from
LTCM, but it would at least have left them
with a $250 million “exit” payment. The
alternative would have been to lose their
equity, their jobs, and their management fees
and get nothing in return—in short, to lose
everything. They would therefore have been
crazy to turn Buffett down, and we must sup-
pose they would not have done so. There is
thus a very strong argument that the Fed
could have abandoned the rescue as late as
the morning of September 23 without letting
LTCM fail. However, if that is the case, it
could also have abandoned its rescue bid ear-
lier without letting LTCM fail. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve could have abstained com-
pletely from intervening, and LTCM would
still not have failed. 
So what did Federal Reserve intervention
actually achieve? The answer depends on
what offers would have been forthcoming for
LTCM in the absence of Federal Reserve
intervention. There would have clearly been
an offer from the Buffett consortium,
because that consortium was operating inde-
pendent of the Fed. However, it is not clear
whether the consortium led by the Federal
Reserve would have come together and made
an offer in the absence of the Fed’s involve-
ment. If it had, the outcome would have pre-
sumably been substantially the same as the
outcome that actually occurred, but without
the Fed’s involvement. However, if there had
been no other offers, the management of
LTCM would probably have accepted the
Buffett offer as the only way to avoid failure.
In that case, the net effect of the Fed’s inter-
vention would have been a better deal for
LTCM’s shareholders and managers, at the
expense of Buffett and his associates who
were thereby deprived of an opportunity to
make a profit from LTCM’s difficulties. That
leads one to wonder whether Buffett has a
case against the Federal Reserve for loss of
income.
What If LTCM Had Failed?
There still remains the hypothetical issue
of what might have happened if LTCM had
failed. Were the Federal Reserve’s fears plau-
sible? I would suggest not. Central bankers
are always worried about the impacts of the
failures of large financial firms on market
“confidence,” and the argument that they
had to intervene to prevent the knock-on
effects of such failures has been used to justi-
fy every bailout since time immemorial.
Nonetheless, no one can deny that financial
markets were in a particularly fragile state in
September 1998. Moreover, LTCM was a big
player that was heavily involved in derivatives
trading; it also had large exposures to many
different counterparties, and many of its
positions were difficult and costly to
unwind. One can therefore readily appreciate
why the Fed was nervous about the prospect
of LTCM’s failing.
There are, nevertheless, a number of rea-
sons to suggest that financial markets could
have absorbed the shock of LTCM’s failing
without going into the financial meltdown
that Federal Reserve officials feared:
•Although many firms would have taken
large hits, the amount of capital in the
markets is in the trillions of dollars. It is
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therefore difficult to see how the mar-
kets as a whole could not have absorbed
the shock, given their huge size relative
to LTCM. The markets might have
sneezed, and perhaps even caught a
cold, but they would hardly have caught
pneumonia.
• When firms are forced to liquidate
positions in response to a major shock,
there are usually other firms willing to
buy at the right price. Sellers may have
to take a loss to liquidate, but buyers
can usually be found, and competition
for good buys usually puts a floor
under sellers’ losses.
• Market experience suggests that the
failure of even a big derivatives player
usually has an impact only on the mar-
kets in which that player was very
active. Worldwide market liquidity has
never been threatened by any such fail-
ure. It follows, then, that the failure of
LTCM might have had a major nega-
tive impact on some of the derivatives
markets in which the fund was active,
but it would not have caused a global
liquidity crisis. 
• In any case, even in those rather
extreme and unusual markets where
liquidity might be paralyzed in the
immediate aftermath of a major shock,
participants have every reason to
resume trading as soon as possible.
Time and time again in the 1990s,
derivatives markets have shown a
remarkable ability to absorb major
shocks and quickly return to normal,
and there is no reason to suppose that
the market response would have been
much different if LTCM had failed.
• Last, but by no means least, there have
been major developments in derivatives
risk management over the last few
years.17 Those developments include the
widespread adoption of value-at-risk
systems to measure and manage overall
risk exposures, the increasing accep-
tance of firm-wide risk management
guidelines,18 the rapid growth of
methodologies for stress testing and
scenario analysis,19 and “credit enhance-
ment” techniques to keep down expo-
sures to counterparties. Those tech-
niques include the use of netting agree-
ments, periodic settlement provisions,
credit triggers, third-party guarantees,
and credit derivatives.20 As a result,
most firms’ “true” exposures are now
only a small fraction of what they
might otherwise appear to be.
The Federal Reserve’s nightmare scenario—a
mass unwinding of positions with wide-
spread freezing of markets—is thus far-
fetched, even in the fragile market conditions
of the time.
There is also another reason why the Fed
was ill-advised to intervene, even if it was right
in its assessment that LTCM would otherwise
have failed. If the Federal Reserve is to pro-
mote market stability, it needs to ensure that
market participants have strong incentives to
promote their own financial health—to avoid
excessive risk taking, to keep their leverage
down to reasonable levels, to maintain their
liquidity, and so forth. However, the best
incentive of all is the fear of dire consequences
if they do not manage themselves properly
and, consequently, default on their obliga-
tions. If the Fed wishes to encourage institu-
tions to be strong, it should make an example
of those that fail. In that context, LTCM pro-
vided the Federal Reserve with an ideal oppor-
tunity to make such an example and send out
the message that no firm, however promi-
nent, could expect to be rescued from the con-
sequences of its own mistakes. Other firms
would have taken note and strengthened
themselves accordingly, and financial markets
would have been more stable as a result.
Throwing LTCM to the wolves would have
strengthened financial markets, rather than
weakened them. 
Consequences of the
Bailout
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Calls for More Regulation
One of the most immediate consequences
of the LTCM affair was calls for more regula-
tion of hedge-fund activities. Among the peo-
ple calling for more regulation was then–sec-
retary of the treasury Robert Rubin, who
called for an interagency study to look at
ways of making the activities of offshore
hedge funds more transparent. Many others
made similar suggestions. However, as one
observer wrote, “Many of these calls have
been pure reflex actions rather than a care-
fully considered response to the issues—if
any—which hedge funds pose for the world
financial system.”21
Those calls were met with widespread dis-
belief offshore. Many people familiar with
offshore operations pointed out that there
was very little that U.S. regulators could actu-
ally do about them. Some pointed out that
attempts to regulate U.S. hedge funds might
drive more of them offshore where they
would be even further out of the reach of U.S.
regulators. The skeptics included Greenspan
himself:
It is questionable whether hedge
funds can be effectively regulated in
the United States alone. While their
financial clout may be large, hedge
funds’ physical presence is small.
Given the amazing communication
capabilities available virtually around
the globe, trades can be initiated
from almost any location. Indeed,
most hedge funds are only a short
step from cyberspace. Any direct U.S.
regulations restricting their flexibili-
ty will doubtless induce the more
aggressive funds to emigrate from
under our jurisdiction.22
He concluded:
The best we can do . . . is what we do
today: Regulate them indirectly
through the regulation of the
sources of their funds. . . . If the funds
move abroad, our oversight will
diminish.23
Greenspan went on to suggest that the
primary defense against the problems posed
by the failures of hedge funds is for their
counterparties to be careful in their dealings
with them (e.g., not extend too much credit).
Greenspan’s assessment is surely correct.
Moreover, since it is also in the interests of
those counterparties to be careful, there
would appear to be no need for (and no point
in) regulating those dealings. In an efficient
economy, parties should be free to make
whatever deals they want with hedge funds,
and it is in their interest not to overexpose
themselves to those or any other risky coun-
terparties.
Massive Extension of Federal
Reserve Responsibilities
The LTCM rescue implies a very large and
problematic extension of the Federal
Reserve’s responsibilities. The LTCM bailout
indicates that the Fed now accepts responsi-
bility for the safety of U.S. hedge funds,
despite the fact that it has no legislative man-
date to do so. Moreover, the Fed accepts that
responsibility even though it has no regula-
tory authority over hedge funds and even
though the chairman of its board explicitly
argues that it should not have any such
authority. The Federal Reserve thus main-
tains the extraordinary position that it
should have responsibility for hedge funds
but no power over them. Even if it is legally
sound, which is questionable, that position is
patently untenable, as it subjects the Fed to a
moral hazard problem over which it has no
control. That position allows large hedge
funds to take risks that the Federal Reserve
cannot control; yet the Fed picks up the tab if
the funds get themselves into difficulties.
Heads they win, tails the Federal Reserve
loses. Responsibility and power cannot be
separated indefinitely, however, and at some
point the Fed would have to abandon its
responsibility for hedge funds or, if its past
empire building is any guide,24 seek regulato-
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ry authority to control them. 
But there is also a deeper problem. Where
does the Federal Reserve draw the line
between U.S. hedge funds and overseas ones?
What is the difference between a U.S. hedge
fund based in Greenwich, Connecticut,
which also operates in the Cayman Islands,
and a Caymans-based hedge fund, which also
operates in Greenwich? The two are indistin-
guishable for all practical purposes, and the
Fed cannot realistically support “American”
hedge funds without also supporting other
hedge funds as well. If the Fed supports large
“U.S.” hedge funds, it could easily find itself
supporting all large hedge funds, regardless
of their “real” nationality. To make matters
even worse, if the Fed becomes responsible
for the hedge-fund industry, where and how
will it draw the line between hedge funds and
other investment firms, particularly those
that might be similar to hedge funds? Where
would the Fed’s responsibility actually end?
Is the logical implication, as one industry
commentator asked, that the Federal Reserve
will “now try to shore up the Japanese bank-
ing system? After all, this is a lot more central
to the fate of the world’s economy and mar-
kets than one particular Greenwich,
Connecticut hedge fund manager.” The
LTCM bailout thus implies a very large and
ultimately intolerable increase in Federal
Reserve responsibilities—without any legisla-
tive mandate whatsoever from Congress.
The Return of Too Big to Fail
The LTCM rescue marks a return to the
discredited doctrine of too big to fail: the
doctrine that the Federal Reserve cannot
allow very big institutions to fail, precisely
because they are big, out of fear of the conse-
quences of their failure for the financial sys-
tem. That doctrine is a direct inducement for
large institutions to act irresponsibly, and
ever since the bailout of Continental Illinois
in 1984, Federal Reserve officials have been
trying to convince large institutions that they
cannot count on Federal Reserve support if
they got themselves into difficulties. That
message seemed to be slowly getting through
to financial firms, and then the LTCM rescue
wiped out all that progress at a stroke. Not
only did the Fed intervene to rescue a large
firm, but the reason given for the interven-
tion—the Fed’s fears of the effects of LTCM’s
failure on world financial markets—was
nothing less than an emphatic restatement
of the doctrine. Too big to fail was back
again, with a vengeance.
The return of too big to fail has serious
consequences for longer-term stability. If the
financial system is to be stable, individual
institutions must be given incentives to make
themselves financially strong. Rescuing a
firm in difficulties then sends out the worst
possible signal, as it leads others to think that
they, too, may be rescued if they get into dif-
ficulties. That weakens their incentive to
maintain their own financial health and so
makes it more likely that they will eventually
get into difficulties. Bailing out a weak firm
may help to calm markets in the very short
term, but it undermines financial stability in
the long run. 
Damage to the Moral Authority of
the Federal Reserve
Perhaps the worst consequence of the
LTCM affair was the damage done to the
credibility and, more important, moral
authority of Federal Reserve policymakers as
they encourage their counterparts in other
countries to persevere with the necessary but
difficult and painful process of economic lib-
eralization. Rep. Jim Leach (R-Iowa), chair-
man of the House Committee on Banking
and Financial Services, was absolutely correct
when he pointed out that “the LTCM saga is
fraught with ironies related to moral author-
ity as well as moral hazard. The Federal
Reserve’s intervention comes at a time when
our government has been preaching to for-
eign governments, particularly Asian ones,
that the way to modernize is to let weak insti-
tutions fail and to rely on market mecha-
nisms, rather than insider bailouts.”26 Allan
Sloan put the same argument more colorful-
ly in Newsweek:
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For 15 months, as financial markets
in country after country collapsed
like straw huts in a typhoon, the
United States lectured the rest of the
world about the evils of crony capital-
ism—of bailing out rich, connected
insiders while letting everyone else
suffer. U.S. officials and financiers
talked about letting market forces
allocate capital for maximum effi-
ciency. Thai peasants, Korean steel-
workers and Moscow pensioners may
suffer horribly as their local
economies and currencies col-
lapse—but we solemnly told them
that was a cost they had to pay for the
greater good. . . . Cronyism bad.
Capitalism good.
Then came the imminent collapse
of Long-Term Capital . . . , the quin-
tessential member of The Club, with
rich fat-cat investors and rich hot-
shot connected managers. Faster
than you can say “bailout,” crony
capitalism U.S. style raised its ugly
head. . . . John Meriwether and the
rest of the guys who ran the fund
onto the rocks got to keep their jobs.
The fund’s investors, whose stakes
would have been wiped out in a col-
lapse, salvaged about seven cents on
the dollar. . . . The rescuers even
agreed to pay a management fee on
their rescue fund.27
The most damaging consequence of the
LTCM episode is therefore the harm done by
the perception that Federal Reserve policy-
makers do not really have the faith to take
their own medicine. How can they persuade
the Russians or the Japanese to let big insti-
tutions fail, if they are afraid to do the same
themselves? At the end of the day, economic
liberalization is just as necessary as it always
was, but in the wake of the LTCM rescue, one
can understand why many of those who have
to pay the price for it might have their
doubts. 
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